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I.

Introduction
In two recent papers in this JOURNAL, Chichilnisky (1980,1981) has

argued that, in.the context of models and under conditions stated by her, a
transfer of resources from the North to the South is immiserizing to the
South; and that increase in demand by the North of the South's exportable
good will be inuniserizing to the South, as well.
These assertions are utilised by the author to deduce policy con
clusions concerning North-South trade relations, the optimal trade strategy
for the South, and the question of the advisability of foreign aid.
are matters of considerable concern at the present juncture.

These

It is essential

therefore to examine the logical validity of these claims.
Both the subjects of immi.serzing transfers and immiserizing growth are,
of course, well understood by the students of international trade theory and
statements of the conditions under which such "paradoxical" phenomena
can be arrived at in specific models are readily available in that literature.I/
What we show here, however, is that such phenomena are derived incorrectly in
the Chichilniskypapers; and that her results simply do not follow from the
assumptions as stated by her.

We do this by examining the Chichilnisky treat

ment of the transferproblem in Section 2, and her handling of the growth
problem in Section 3.

In view of the essential simplicity of the Chichilnisky

models, it should be both sufficient and illuminating to utilise the simple
geometric methods of trade theory to demonstrate, as we do, the mistakes in
Chichilnisky.

However, the Appendix provides a simple formal algebraic

treatment of the Chichilnisky models and deduces the correct results.
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II.

Immiseriz ing Transfers from Abroad:
In Chichilni sky (1980), a simple exchange model with fixed coefficie nts

in consumpti on is used.

It is a socalled North-Sou th model, with the North

different iated into Rich and Poor groups,.an d the South kept homogeneous;
she endows each group with fixed quantitie s of 2 goods, A and B, and with
fixed consumpti on coefficie nts.

Besides, the South spends a larger proportio n

of income than the Poor on B goods whereas the latter, in turn, spend a greater
proportio n on B goods than their Rich compatrio ts.

With the Rich transferr ing

A goods to the South, the following theorem is stated (1980, p. 510):

Theorem 1: Assume that the endowments of the South are small, con
sisting mostly of basic goods Band that condition s (C.l) and (C.2)
are satisfied .
Then a transfer of the luxury or investmen t good A.from the resources
of the high income group in the North to the South will necessari ly
decrease the welfare of the South and increase the welfare of the
North, in a (Walrasia n) stable market.JJ
Unfortun ately, this cannot be correct:

and the error is immediate ly evident.

Thus, take Figure 1, where the South is represent ed.
Then, p

1

is the initial price ratio,

c1

Let

E
1

be the endowment.

the consumpti on point so that South

exports B goods and Us the social welfare for (homogeneous) South.
coefficie nts in consumpti on are shown.
amount E E •
1 2

Fixed

Let South new receive A goods of

Now, as in standard Samuelson ian 2-state argumenta tion, we can

deduce a rise in excess demand for B goods in the world markets as a result
of the transfer, at constant terms of trade, if the Rich spend a lower pro
portion of income on B goods than South does, as assumed by the author (1980,
p. 509).

Given Walrasian market stability , therefore , the relative price of

C
0

0
0

C)

GOOD a
Figure 1
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B goods must rise:

pl yields to p •
2

Under these assumptions, which are

totally consistent with the stated assumptions of Chichilnisky prior to, and
including in (Theorem 1) paragraph 2, we have welfare improvement for the
South; and hence the assertion that the transfer will necessarily decrease
the welfare of the South is evidently invalid.
It is equally evident that we could show inuniserization by assuming in
Figure 1 that the South was exporting A goods rather than B goods: such that c
was replaced in Figure 1 by

c•1

(and a suitable shift in p }.
2

1

But then we have

to reckon with the author's added assumption, in Theorem 1, paragraph 1, that "the
endowments of the South are small, consisting mostly of basic goods B."

If the

endowment is sufficiently large in B goods and negligible in A goods, as is
consistent with the assumption made, then the implied trade pattern initially
would be definitely at a point such as c

1

with B goods being exported initially.

In that case, welfare improvement of the South (rather than its immiserization}

4/

must follow!-

III.

Immiserizing Growth:
The claims in Clnj.chilnisky(19 81} are unfortunately no more valid than

those in Chichilnisky(19 80).

Before we discuss the model itself, we need to

reproduce some of the author's statements in regard to the theory of
immiserizing growth in Bhagwati (1958) (1968) s
"our results also differ both in assumptions and in policy conclusions
from others in the existing formalised trade and growth literature on the
immiserising effects of growth [cf. Bhagwati (1968, 1972)), Mundell (1968}].
In those works the results emerge from assumptions on int9rnational markets
such as, for instance, different international elasticities of demand for
the goods in which the North and the South specialise: the exports of the
South are assumed to have inelastic demand internationally while the exports
o_f the North have more elastic demands. Therefore, as the South attempts
to grow more than the North, the prices of the exports of the South fall
significantly, thus undermining its growth efforts •••
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The res ults in thi s pap er hav e a
dua l cha rac ter wit h resp ect to tho
se of
Bha gwa ti (196 8, 197 2), sinc e our
s dep end mor e on the beh avio ur of
sup ply
of fac tors of pro duc tion rath er
than on the ela stic ity of demand
for
goo ds.
(198 1, p. 182 )
It mus t be sta ted tha tOi ich ilni sky

err s in reg ard to wha t Bha gwa ti
(195 8)

show ed as a con diti on for inm iser
iz.i ngg row th in a cou ntry . He dem
ons trat ed tha t
eith er an ine las tic fore ign off er
cur ve, ,£;: ultr a-b ias ed grow th wit
h neg ativ e
out put -ela stic ity of sup ply of the
imp orta ble goo d when the fore ign
off er cur ve
is ela stic , wou ld make inu nise rizi
ng grow th pos sib le. It is sim ply
wro ng to
ass ert the refo re tha t an ine las tic
fore ign off er cur ve is nec essa ry
for
imm iser izin g gro wth to occ ur in
the Bha gwa ti cas e. The ass erte d
"du al" cha rac ter
fo Bha gwa ti's theo rem wit h tha t
app are ntly pro ved in Chi chi lnis ky(
l98 1), wit h
the form er dep end ing on ine las tic
demand and the lat ter on fac tor
sup ply , is
thu s inc orr ect .
But , apa rt from thi s err or, the re
is also no app rec iati on of the fac
t tha t
Bha gwa ti was dea ling wit h dom esti
c, exo gen ous ly-s pec ifie d grow th
tha t
imm iser ized the gro win g cou ntry .

To exp lore imi ser izin g grow th in
her mod el,

Chi chi lnis ky wou ld hav e to solv e
for the eff ect of exp ans ion tha t
is bot h dom esti c
and exo gen ous , eith er due to tec
hni cal cha nge or due to cap ital
acc umu lati on,
on dom esti c wel fare : the way it
is don e, and nee ds to be don e, in
Bha gwa ti (195 8)
(196 8) et al. Thi s, she doe s not
do.
Ins tea d, as she is con cern ed wit
h the eff ect s on the Sou th of assu
med "sh ifts
in the demand of the Nor th" (198
1, p. 178 ; foo tno te 11) , she sho
uld be con cern ed
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with the very diffe rent issue as to whet her growt
h (or other param etric or
polic y shift ) elsew here can immi serize a coun try.
And of cours e, it shoul d
come as no surp rise that growt h (or other shift )
may imply an adver se shift
in the forei gn offer curve facin g a coun try and there
fore the coun try loses
some of the gains from trade and is immi serize d relat
ive to the situa tion
prior to this exter nal growt h (or other shift ).
Unfo rtuna tely, howe ver, even this analy sis is erron
eous in Chic hilni sky
(1981 ) becat Se it is fatal ly flawe d, as is the bulk
of the pape r, by the false
argum ent that, in the model spec ified by her, an
incre ase in the demand for
the expo rtabl e (at each price ) would reduc e, rathe
r than incre ase, the price
of the expo rtabl e:
"OUr case refle cts, inste ad, shift s in the demand
of the North , that
incre ase the demand for the expo rtabl e at each price
. This would under
tradi tiona l assum ption s incre ase the price of the
expo rtabl e. In our
case just the oppo site effec t takes place ."(
, p.
, footn ote 11)
1981

178

The rest of this Secti on is there fore devot ed to
show ing very simpl y using
a geom etric techn ique devel oped by Rona ld Findl ay,
that this centr al prop ositio n
canno t hold in the model as spec ified by her; that,
in fact, the model is
extre mely well- behav ed indee d in this regar d.2/
The model is, in essen ce, a
2x2x2 model with two point s to note: the produ ction
funct ions are chara cteri zed
by fixed coef ficie nts, and the supp lies of facto rs
are varia ble with respe ct
to rewa rds, in each coun try. Let the facto rs be
Kand L, and the goods be I
and B. Then, the follo wing holds for each of the
2 coun tries . In any in
comp letely spec ializ ed produ ction equil ibriu m the
goods price (PI/P B)
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determine s the factor price ratio (w/r) through the usual zero profit
condition s under pure competiti on and constant returns to scale in productio n.
These in turn determine factor quantitie s (Kand L) through the postulate d
relations hips between factor supplies and real factor rewards.
given the factor supplies, outputs of

I (QI) and B (QB)

Finally,

are determine d

using the condition that factors are fully employed.
Now, let PI/PB

increase.

We can then see that, if I is the K-intensi ve

good, w/r falls, therefore K increases and L falls.
argument underlyin g Rybczynsk i theorem,

Therefore , as in the

QI increases and QB falls.

Therefore ,

given Walras' Law so that we concentra te on the I market, we see in Figure 2
that QI is a monotoni cally increasin g function of PI/PB.
this is assumed constant.

As for demand for I,

Therefore DI is a vertical line.
A A
countries to get aggregate DI,
QI curves, as in Figure 3.

Now, add both

One could not therefore get a stronger result; the equilibriu m is unique
and evidently Walras-st able.

Now consider the North to have an increased demand

for South's exportabl e good B, as in Chichilni sky.
D~

curve shifting to the left to

This is equivalen t to the

We then get the orthodox conclusio n that

P /PB must decrease with increased demand for the B good.
1

Unfortuna tely,

therefore , the Chichilni sky assertion to the contrary must be quietly buried.
And, since this assertion is central to her paper, we must necessari ly reject
the theoretic al and policy conclusio ns drawn in the paper as well.Y

a
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FOOTNOTES

1.

Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grant No. SCS-8-25401
for support of Bhagwati's research underlying this paper.

Conversations

with Richard Brecher, Ronald Findlay, Tatsuo Hatta, Neantro Saavedra,
and Pablo Serra have been very helpful.

2.

To say that such paradoxes have been demonstrated - e.g. Bhagwati (1958,
1968) on innniserizing growth; Leontief (1936 ), Samuelson (1947, 1952 ),
Brecher and Bhagwati (1981a, 1981b) on innniserizing transfers from abroad is no~ to say that they are likely.

Some of these results may be equally

interpretated as showing the improbability of the paradoxical outcomes
arising because of the conditions established for their occurrence.

3.

Condition C.1 and C.2 ensure that an equilibrium exists with a positive
price for basic goods and that equilibrium prices vary continuously
with the parameters of the model.

4.

If we were to assume, however, that the South was exporting A goods, the
interesting question, of course, is whether we would then be able to show
the South's innniserization, consistent with Walrasian stability.

The answer

to this question is that, yes, it is possible to show this in a 3-agent model
even though, in the 2-agent Leontief (1936)-Samuelson (1947,1952)analysis,
we know that Walrasian instability is required for the transferee to be
innniserized.

This proposition,developed in Brecher-Bhagwati (1981a) at
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length and with condition s for immiseriz ation carefully and simply spelled
out, is easily understoo d in its essence as follows.

Thus, recall the

2-country Samuelson -Mundell (1960) criterion for the welfare impact on the
transfere e:

This is:

auII
mI + mII ... l
--= 1 dT
. £I + tII - l

=

(1)

e:'I + £,II
£I + £II _ l

where the transfero r is country I, the transfere e is country II, m1 and mII are
the marginal propensi ties to spend on importabl es (in a 2.-good setting) and
£I, £II are the compensat ed offer curve elasticit ies.

Since e:'I and £'·II are

duII > o' i'f £I+ c..~II > 1, i.e.
definitel y signed . under the usual assumptio ns, dT
if market stability is assumed. The transfe~e e cannot be imrniseriz ed.
When, however, an "outside" country or agent is assumed, say country III,
which neither makes

nn.,...

,...~,...,=d ~7 oc the transfer, t,,.11en the formula rrru.st clearly be

modified to take this into account.

The income terms in the numerator will now

belong only to the transfero r I and the transfere e II, whereas the offer curve
elasticit y e:II must now be a weighted sum of the offer curve elasticit ies of
countries II and III.

Therefore

auII

will no longer show now simply the COIT\-·
QT
pensated elasticit y tenns in the numerato~ 1 and, depending on the relative patterns
of trade of countries II and III, as also their respectiv e marginal propensit ies
to import, the immiseriz ation of country II can arise, even though Walrasian
stability obtains.
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5.

We are indebted to Ronald Findlay who demonstrated clearly the well
behaved nature of the Chichilnisky model and hence the error of her
contrary assertions, by producing the simple argumentation we have
used in the next.

This error and several other problems afflictini

the details of the Chichilnisky analysis, have been noted by Neantro
Saavedra (1981) in a thorough comment.

6. We may stress that this is not to say that, in policymaking, we need not
worry about possibilities of adverse outcomes for recipients of transfers
such as foreign aid, for example.

Not merely have trade theorists, for

instance, produced interesting cases of such adverse outcomes, as we noted
in footnote 2, using conventional value-theoretic general-equilibrium
models, but also there is a substantial theoretical literature on
issues such as the possibly deleterious effects of foreign aid via reduced
domestic savings and domestic agricultural performance, and via de
stabilization efforts made possible through "aid-dependence," with some
of this literature to be found in this JOURNAL itself

(e.g. 1975, pp. 85-98)
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APPENDIX

(A)

The Transfer Problem
Consider a country with the following Samuelsonian social utility function:

F(B,A) = Min [B, AA] , A> 0
and an endowment

(EB, EA)

(1)

of the two goods A and B.

Then its excess

demands (DB, DA) could be easily shown to be (with PA, PB as the price per
unit of good A and B respectively in an accounting unit):
For

(PA=

o,

PB> 0)

A

"

(P . > O, PB> 0)

"

A
B
(P > O, P · =0)

1
D > T
EB - EA
A-

D = 0
B
D
B

=

PA(AEA - EB)
PA+ >.PB

DB,?_ AEA - EB

(2a)

PB(EB - >.EA)

,

D =

,

D = 0

A

PA+ >.PB

(2c)

A

Now the indirect utility function

(2b)

that

corresponds to the direct utility function F(B, A) is given by:
for

A

PB >O, P

(3a)

= 0

(3b)

(3c)
for H, A = 1

Now npting that in Chichilnisky(l980):
and A= c
of

A and

for
TB

S

(ii)

units of

transfer endowment of good

c > l >

!

(iii)

H makes a transfer of

B to S we get (denoting by E~
J

j

in country

i):

the net of

TA

for L,
units

A2

(4a)

(4b)

(4c)
W

The world exces s demands

a (H_ -

>

Dw

A

=

DW

B
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D and
A

+ L +

T )

B

B

W

D are (for
B

Les
+
c
B

A

P -= O, PB > 0):

T ) -

(H

B

A

-

+ LA + SA + TA )

TA

O

(Sa)

(Sb)

Hence if

(Sc)

< 0

s::

..•

then

PA-= O,

PB> O for any

PB> 0

is a possi ble equil ibrium price vecto r.

Obvio usly, one can then choos e good Bas nume raire
(Sc) does not involv e
as

TA

TA, if it holds for some

is varie d keepinE?

TB

fixed .

and set

P

B

= 1.

Since

TB' it contin ues to hold

Hence chang es in

TA

do

not affec t

equil ibrium price s or welfa re.

From (3a) it can be easily shown that (as

long as (5c) holds

TB is varie d equili brium price s remai n at

so that as

II:

-1,

- o,

so that the rich in the

Norrn 1ose and Sourh gains by an incre ase in the trans fer

Now for
DW
A

=

pA >

o,

p

B

TB.

- 0,

0

(6a)
(6b)

Hence if

0

(6c)

A3

then

p

A

>O,

B

P

O for any

c

is a poss ible equil ibriu m price vecto r.

we can choos e good A as nu~r aire and set PA
With

TA

fixed , do

= 1.

In this case, chang es in

TB

not affec t (6c) and hence the equil ibriu m.
dGH
TA, we get using (3c) that dTA

(6c), holds while we vary

e

-

As long as
1 dGL
dGS
a' dT -= o, dT
A

IC

A

Henc e, once again the rich in the North lose and South
gains by an incre as~ in
Let us now consi der equi libri a in which

PA> 0

and

PB> 0

so that

l

PB[HB - TB - a (HA - TA)]+ PB(LB - LA)
(7a)

l

PA+ aPB

PA+ PB

(7b)

PA[c(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB)]

+- ---PA+----- -cPB
Setti ng PB = l, defin ing
P

law, the equil ibriu m

is obtai ned from
D: (P)

=p

+
'aDW
Now

PA
P = and using Wal"ras'
PB

B

'aTA

P(LA - LB)
P + l

~fc(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB)]
.
p + C

=

-a- P+lp

=

-aaPP+l

anw

B
3TB

[HA - TA) - a(¾ - TB)] +
,aP + l

+

Pc
P+c

_L

P+c

> 0

>

I:

0

and

0

since

(8)

(9)

C

a > 1

(10)

c.
TA._

A4

Hence if

then

Walrasian Stable)
*

at an equilibrium P* (i.e. if the equilibrium is

0

>

anw)

aP
-aTA

= ~-D~

ap*
aTB

- (•n~ anw~jP=P

aTA

aTB

P=P*

apB

~
ap

*

<

0

(11)

<

0

(12)

Hence an increase in transfers of either kind unambiguouslyre duce the equilibrium
A good.

~elative price of the

Using (3b) we r.et:
aGll
=
3TA

* .
-P
(aP*+l) +

~GH
-1
=· - (aP*+l)
aTB

by

H •

Since

-

+

"n*
;; < 0

(13)

!TA

(aP* + 1/

[ (HA ;- TA) -a(HB - TB)] .

Now (HA - TA) - a(~ - TB)
B

*
- a(~ - TB)] 3P
[(HA - T)
A

·*
aP
aTB

·-

(a.PX+ 1)2

(14)

has the same sign as the excess demand for good
and

0, a sufficient thou~h not necessary

A

con~itiou for both types of transfers to reduce the welfare of
is that

H is a net demander of basic goods.

li

unawbiruously

This is intuitively obvious

also, since transfers raise the price of basic goods relative to luxuries
and at unchanged prices, they reduce the expenditure of

H.

Hence, if

is a net demander of basic goods, both effects work with same direction
to reduce welfare.

Now,

H

AS

acL
3TA
3GL

LA - LB

=

(P* + 1>2
LA - LB

=

3TB

Since

L

(P* + 1)

2

3p*
·-3TA

(15)

-

(16)

ap*
oTB

neither makes nor receives a transfer, its welfare is affected

soJely due to the change in equilibriu m prices.

As such it is maie better

(worse) off according as it is a net supplier(d emander) of
according as

LA - LB<(>) O.

C

p*

Hence

+

C

(P* + c) 2

(17)

• aTA

(18)

C

S unambiguo usly benefits from either kind of transfer as

long as he is a net supplier
as long as

Now,

{~(SA+ TA) - (SB+ TB)} aP*

cP*

= -..----+
(P"+ c)

B goods i.e.

of B goods even after the transfers i.e.

c(SA + TA) - (SB+ TB)

<

0.

In particula r, if

South's

endowment (inclusiv e of transfer) of non-basic goods is small relative to
its endowment (inclusiv e of transfer) of basic goods, it must necessari ly
gain by transfers .
It can be shown however that given ca> 1, in an equilibriu m with
PA> 0, PB> 0.

LB~ LA

implies c(SA +TA)> (SB+ TB) so that Northern

poor and thetSouth cannot both be net suppliers of
(B)

B ~oods.

Terms of Trade Problems
Following Chichilni sky (1981) let us denote the productio n functions

for the South as:

A6

LB KB
]
B = Min[- ,
al
I

with

KI

(19b)

, -]

I

=

Min[-1._
al

D

=

alc2 - a2cl

Denoting by

(19a)

cl

cl

> 0 •

W the wage rate,

P

B

the price of good

the rental rate on capital (all in terms of the

I

B and

R

good as num~raire)· the

aggregate factor supply functions are:

=

L

K=

w

a(p)
B

+

(20a)

L

BR+ K

(20b)

In any incompletely specialized production equilibrium profit
maximization at positive and finite levels of output requires:
p

=

(21a)

1 =

(21b)

B

Equation (21b) is the factor-price frontier of this model.

We can rewrite

equations (21a) and (21b) as:
(22a)
(22b)

A7

D > O,

Clearly, with

1

O, a

>

2

> 0, a

PB

rise in

increases

R if the production equilibrium continues to be imcompletely

W and reduces

w , the real wage in terms of good B, also increases
(p)

Also

specialized.

c

B

which in turn means (because of 20a and 20b) that a rise in

increases

PB

aggregate supply of labour and reduces aggregate supply of capital.
Now, given Chichilnisky's assumption that factor markets always clear,
the outputs

S

B, I

S

of the South given
c

BS(PB)

IS(PB)

=

2

B
L(P) - a

2

P

B

B
K(P)
(23a)

D
a

=

1

B
K(P) - c

1

B
L(P )
(23b)

D

is an increasing function of
function of

5
PB, B (PB)

decreasing dunction of
I

for good

plainly wrong:

PB and

B

is unique

is a feasible demand). Chichilnisky states that

I

PB

values for a given

I. This is

either there is none or there is only one.

South's output of
QS(PB)
D

IS(P~) is a

As such, given an exogenously specified demand

PB.

Now in a trading equilibrium, if we

9

is a decreasing

and

is an increasing function of

there are two possible equilibrium

where

B

P

I , if the economy is closed, equilibrium P

provided it exists (i.e.

demand

can be written as:

B goods as

B
QDB(P ,9)

denote the aggregate demand for
representing the sum of domestic

and North's excess demand for South's exports i.e. ~(PB, 9)

is a shift parameter, equilibrium PB is determined by

=

(24)

A8

Hence

Walrasian stability requires

Hence, if there is a favourable shift in North's demand for South's exports
> 0

o.

d W
This in term means that ~ ( B ) >

0

as

p

well, that is the real wages in the South in term of basic goods goes up
as well.

